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Abstract 
This paper reports results from a study of business owners carried out in 2016 in the region around 
Mount Zao, an active stratovolcano in Japan. In April 2015, Mount Zao experienced a period of 
unrest consistent with magma rising in the volcanic system. This led to alerts and public awareness 
campaigns, which provoked extensive media interest. This project used a survey and 12 semi-
structured interviews to examine the opinions of business people on how the crisis was managed, 
and how it affected them. It also examined the perceptions of risk and the stories that were told 
about the potential eruption. Business owners who thought that an eruption would be harmful and 
that forecasting eruptions is difficult were more likely to be trusting. In general, respondents were 
very unaware of the risk from the volcano and the hazards that it could produce. The data also show 
that the impacts of disasters and even warning periods can cascade, much as hazards do: 
respondents noted that the crisis period effectively extended the time it has taken them to recover 
from the impact of the Tohoku earthquake in 2011, or brought them low just as they recovered. 
With increased vulnerability, the warning period at Zao exacerbated their situation, and this was not 
helped by a lack of scientific information and some perceived “rumours”. The paper suggests that 
public engagement via participatory strategies would be beneficial in reducing risk in this region, 
because it would enable stakeholders to own their risk and understand it. 
Keywords: Volcanic risk; Developed countries; Volcanic unrest; Risk perception; Disaster impacts; 
Tourist industry 
Introduction 
Mount Zao is a complex stratovolcano in northern Honshu, Japan (Figure 1). It is historically one of 
Japan’s most frequently active volcanoes (Table 1). It typically erupts basaltic to andesitic 
composition lavas, and has a long history of minor eruptive activity that is well documented (Ban et 
al., 2008). However, the last activity was a minor event in 1940, so on the edge of living memory. 
The volcano is also a popular tourist attraction in Japan, particularly in winter, when its famous 
“snow monsters” make an appearance, and when the ski slopes are open. It is famous too for its hot 
springs (Onsen), which are frequented by visitors from the local area and other parts of Japan. The 
volcano is also at the boundary between two Japanese Prefectures, Miyagi and Yamagata, which 
means that there are different locally led approaches to risk reduction on the different sides of the 
volcano (Cabinet Office, 2015). The volcano is also breached to the east side, such that the risk from 
hazardous flows is generally higher in Miyagi than in Yamagata (JMA, 2013). 
In September 2014, scientists had detected ground deformation around Mount Zao, and in October, 
the crater lake Okama at the summit turned white. On 7th April 2015, an increase in seismicity was 
detected, and led to a volcanic alert being issued in the Zao area on 13th April. The seismic activity 
continued for about a month, and the alert was discontinued by the Japanese Meteorological 
Agency on 16th June. These events took place in the shadow of the Ontake eruption on 27th 
September, 2014, which had shocked Japan: the volcano exploded without warning and killed 63 
people who were hiking near the summit. The Japan Times reported on 14th April: 
 With Ontake’s eruption still fresh in people’s minds, the latest warning quickly stoked fear in 
visitors, said a tourism association spokesman for the Zao ski and onsen resort. 
“Okama is one of the key tourist spots in Zao,” he said, referring to the color-changing lake in 
Zao’s crater, “but people think the resort is already dangerous to enter, just because it has 
the same name as the volcano.” 
Many other media sources also made this link between the two volcanoes. Following the alert level, 
tourism decreased sharply in the region, leading both the Miyagi and Yamagata Prefectures to 
introduce discount schemes to encourage tourists to return (Kuri et al., 2017). The region is strongly 
dependent on tourism, both from within Japan and overseas (Kajitani et al., 2013).  
 
 
Figure 1. Map showing the area around Mount Zao (red triangle). Red triangles on map of Japan 
are volcanoes from the LaMEVE database (Crosweller et al., 2012). Red lines are at 1km, 5km, 
10km and 20km, to illustrate the distances around the volcano. Zao Onsen is a major ski resort in 
Yamagata Prefecture; Togatta Onsen is a hot springs resort area in Miyagi. Imagery is Landsat 4-5 
MSS, overlaid with an SRTM DEM. Grey lines show the boundaries between Prefectures (white 
text). 
Table 1. Eruption history of Mt Zao. All activity noted here in stage 4 has been located at Okama 
lake, at the summit of Zaosan. Sources: Ban et al. (2008); Tatsumi et al. (2008); Takebe and Ban 
(2015); JMA (2013). 
Stage Dates Eruption style VEI (where known) 
1 c. 1Ma Pyroclastics  
2 c. 300ka Lavas  
3 100-300ka Lavas  
4 30ka to 
present 
Pyroclastics, lavas  
4: historical activity 
since 1000 
C12th-15th Regular activity – tephra fall Up to 3 
 1620-1625 Regular activity – tephra fall 3 
 1669-70 Tephra fall 3 
 1694 Moderate eruption 2 
 1794-6 Eruptive activity 2 
 1804, 1806, 
1809 
Eruptive activity 2 
 1821 Eruptive activity 2 
 1830-33 Eruptions, tephra fall 2 
 1867 Phreatic activity 2 
 1873 Eruptive activity 1 
 1894-7 Tephra fall 2 
 1906 Small phreatic eruption 1 
 1940 Tephra fall 1 
 
A timeline of the disruption caused by the warning is provided in Figure 2. This shows that the crisis 
was prolonged – the volcano remained restless from autumn 2014 until the time of the fieldwork for 
this project in 2016. During this time, the alert level was raised to 2 in April and lowered to 1 in June, 
but warnings continued to be issued into early 2016 due to periods of raised seismicity. More 
importantly, perhaps, no announcement was made that the crisis was over. During this period, 
volcanic hazard maps were revised repeatedly and an evacuation plan was announced almost a year 
after the initial alert (Figure 2). 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of this alert on local businesses, focussing in particular on 
the impacts, role of the media and the respondents’ perceptions of risk and uncertainty surrounding 
volcanic activity. 
 Figure 2. Timeline of the volcanic crisis at Mount Zao. Seismic events are shown in purple and 
ground deformation in green. Social and warning information is dark blue. 
Background 
Volcanic risk and warnings 
Volcanoes produce a wide range of hazards that have diverse impacts on lives and livelihoods. The 
hazards produced vary between eruptions and between volcanoes, and can be catastrophic in 
magnitude. Previous studies (Donovan et al., 2014; Donovan et al., 2015; Eiser et al., 2015; Greene 
et al., 1981) have looked therefore at public perceptions of the likelihood of different hazards. This 
provides some information on public awareness of the types of hazard, as well as their likelihoods in 
a particular context. Impacts from eruptions may also be varied in magnitude and duration. 
However, it can be challenging for populations to understand potential impacts prior to an eruption 
(Dominey-Howes and Minos-Minopoulos, 2004; Gregg et al., 2004). Impact perceptions are 
therefore also an important variable in understanding risk perception for volcanic hazard. 
The impact of volcano warning periods on populations has been documented in a number of case 
studies, particularly that of La Soufrière de Guadeloupe in 1976 (Hincks et al., 2014), in which 
phreatic activity led to a costly evacuation. However, similar issues have occurred in periods of 
heightened alert level elsewhere (Donovan et al., 2012; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2015). This has 
led to considerable anxieties among volcanologists about “false alarms”, and discussion of how to 
engage with affected populations. Nevertheless, there has been relatively little work on the social 
dynamics of an alert period that does not include any observed surface activity.  
Eiser et al. (2012) discuss the issue of warning, and frame it in the context of signal detection theory, 
suggesting that the interpretation of a risk signal will ultimately depend on what kind of errors 
people are willing to accept. They also caution against the importation of results from other fields in 
understanding disaster risk, because the kinds of uncertainty that are experienced may be different. 
However, there are some examples from other fields that have dealt with “near-misses” in a systems 
framework (Dillon, 2008; Dillon and Tinsley, 2008; Tinsley et al., 2012). These studies also suggest 
that participants with information about near-misses might have lower perceived risk – and that 
therefore “false alarms” can damage risk perception. However, in the context of catastrophic risk, 
the argument of Eiser et al. (2012) and indeed Hincks et al. (2014) would be that the Precautionary 
Principle applies – and there is evidence that in the context of risk, people would generally prefer to 
be warned (Eiser et al., 2015). 
An additional issue during warning periods is that of trust (Bronfman et al., 2016; Eiser et al., 2008; 
Haynes, 2007; Kasperson et al., 1991; Paton, 2008; White and Eiser, 2005). Trust can have a 
significant impact on people’s willingness to respond to warnings, and also their response to 
information more generally (Wachinger et al., 2013). Trust in different sources of information varies 
between places – for example, Haynes et al. (2007a) found that Montserratians trusted family and 
friends. This was also true of Icelanders – but not of the UK public – in relation to volcanic hazard 
from Iceland (Eiser et al., 2015). Warnings issued by untrusted groups are unlikely to be successful in 
generating a behavioural response (Mileti and Sorensen, 1990).  
Risk, businesses and cascades 
The links between risk perception and financial interests have been investigated by social 
psychologists interested particularly in the motivations behind trust (e.g. Eiser et al. (2008)). People 
are more likely to trust groups that they do not perceive as having financial interest (ie potential 
financial gain or loss) in the outcome of a risk decision – so if a group is perceived as potentially 
gaining from a decision to take a precautionary approach to risk, then that group might be less well 
trusted by the public, and the public may be more sceptical about the risk. This parallels 
circumstances in which political figures or the media are less well trusted because their motivations 
are perceived to be political or sensational rather than altruistic (Haynes et al., 2007a): ultimately, 
perceived motive can be important in trust (Critchley, 2008). However, in the context of volcanic 
risk, populations can also stand to experience considerable losses in a crisis, and their trust in 
different groups may subsequently be affected by their experience of loss. Volcanoes are frequently 
tourist attractions (Bird et al., 2010; Erfurt-Cooper and Cooper, 2010). This means that they are 
visited by large numbers of people who have very little local knowledge of the topography or the 
risk. Furthermore, volcanic eruptions can occur at short notice, as did the Ontake eruption, and 
tourists hiking near the summit may not be warned in time.  
The area that we have selected for this study is prone to multiple hazards, including earthquakes and 
extreme weather events. In 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) had a 
catastrophic impact across the Tohoku region. Furthermore, it caused a crisis at the Fukushima 
power plant that generated considerable fear across Japan (Tateno and Yokoyama, 2013). The 
economic impact of the crisis was significant (Bachev and Ito, 2014; Yamane et al., 2013). Bachev 
and Ito (2014) also found in their study that “harmful rumours” were perceived as a significant factor 
in reducing product uptake. Businesses  worry about the stigma associated with risk perception that 
is excessive (Schulze and Wansink, 2012), and so their perceived source of this is also important. 
The context in which we have situated the study thus provides an interesting one in which to assess 
the impact of a volcanic alert period that did not result in an eruption: the area was already 
experiencing economic challenges, and had also suffered considerable damage in the earthquake. 
Recent work has studied the complexity of cascading hazards, and also some of the challenges that 
are endemic in an interconnected world – both through supply chains and communication (Pescaroli 
and Alexander, 2015; Tierney, 2007). The potential for the impact of GEJET to exacerbate 
vulnerability to the warning period and possible eruption is therefore also of interest in this paper. 
Risk perception and experience 
Social psychologists have noted the importance of “seeing” in risk perception. The availability bias, 
for example, emphasises the importance of past experience in regarding a risk as significant (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1973). More recent work backs up this observation (Demuth et al., 2016; Ho et al., 
2008) and also argues that perception of a risk is not adequate for action: other factors are also 
significant (e.g. Wachinger et al. (2013)). Work on climate change has also demonstrated that 
“belief” in climate change – awareness of the risk – is also partially dependent on having viewed the 
effects (Reser et al., 2014; Spence et al., 2012), as well as on socio-economic factors, for example. 
The question of when people act on a risk they perceive is more complex (Sims and Baumann, 1983), 
since priorities come into play: those who cannot afford to leave their businesses are much less 
likely to do so than those who can, for example (Fischhoff and Morgan, 2009; Gaillard, 2008). Thus, 
understanding the feelings of business owners towards alerts is important. In addition, it is 
important to understand the most effective ways of engaging with communities during warning 
periods, and the best methods to ensure that scientific and risk information is communicated clearly.  
Work in the social studies of disaster risk strongly emphasises the need to engage with communities 
so that they can cope with the risks that they face (Eiser et al., 2012; Gaillard and Mercer, 2013; 
Wisner et al., 2012), and this has been recognised widely in scientific communities involved in 
outreach work, such as volcano observatories. This means that risk communication is not a 
straightforward, mono-directional process: it is not a matter of informing people about the risk or 
the science alone. While some basic scientific knowledge is important, this should be conveyed 
through dialogue with policymakers and the public (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2014; Irwin, 2014; 
Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Jasanoff, 2004). Science does not take place in a vacuum, and populations 
have to be able to assess where evidence comes from and what it means. In order to facilitate this 
process, the needs of communities and their expectations of experts have to be established.  
In this paper, we investigate the 2015 crisis at Mount Zao in Japan, focussing on the responses of 
business owners and the impact of the crisis on their lives. We examine in particular their perception 
of hazards and risk, and their levels of trust in particular agencies. We also discuss their concerns 
about false alarms and future events, and their views about their needs. We also assess differences 
between Miyagi and Yamagata Prefectures, which differ both in their disaster mitigation strategies 
and information, and in their physical geography – Miyagi is on the east side of the volcano, which is 
more hazard-prone than Yamagata (according to the hazard maps produced by the Japanese 
Meteorological Association).  
Methods 
This project involved 12 semi-structured interviews in January 2016, followed by a survey of 80 
businesses in the Zao region. The interviews were designed to investigate the impacts of the 2015 
volcanic crisis on Mount Zao on local businesses, particularly those that depend on tourism. 
Interviewees were asked about the business impacts of the crisis; their perception of the volcano 
and volcanic risk before and during the crisis; their access to information about the volcanic crisis; 
the role of government, media and tourist boards in managing the crisis; their own role in managing 
the risk; and what they would like to see done to support them in a future crisis. The responses to 
the interviews were coded thematically using a grounded theory approach. They were also used in 
the subsequent design of the survey. Interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to 2 hours, and 
took place in Togatta Onsen, Zao Onsen and at businesses along the roads on the lower slopes of the 
volcano. 
Following the interviews, themes that had emerged were identified and included in the survey to 
examine whether or not the survey respondents had similar experiences – for example, interviewees 
mentioned that the Emperor’s visit had helped, so this was included in the survey. Another issue 
that came up regularly was the current state of the volcano, so the survey was also used to explore 
that further and check whether or not the views of interviewees were shared in the wider group. 
The survey was designed to examine similar issues to the interviews, and also to explore the 
dimensions of trust and uncertainty of information in volcanic crisis management on Zao. The 
questions analysed in the survey are shown in Table 2. In addition to these, a number of questions 
about the financial details of business impacts were asked and will be written up elsewhere. 
Respondents were also asked to provide some demographic details: age, gender, nationality, town 
and state, how long they have lived in the area, what kind of business they own, and whether or not 
they have business impacts that they can attribute to the 2015 alerts. There were also two 
comments boxes – which sources gave them information in 2015, and how their business was 
affected by the alerts. Basic frequencies for the data using a slightly different methodological 
approach are given in Kuri et al., 2017. The response rate for the survey was 33.1% (80 
questionnaires were returned out of 242 sent out by post).  
Statistical methods 
The surveys used a scale variable for measuring perceptions. The use of scale variables in statistical 
analysis is contested (Jamieson, 2004), and so care was taken here to assess how the scale was used 
(Norman, 2010). We compared the results from parametric and non-parametric tests, and these 
suggested that the intervals between units on the scales (which had 5 points) were used 
consistently. We have treated the variables as continuous for the purpose of regression analyses. 
Given that the distributions failed normality tests, we have carried out non-parametric analyses on 
the data (Kruskal Wallis, Mann-Whitney, Chi-square). We report both means and medians in the 
tables. Care was taken to avoid significant test results that occur because of small groups, due to the 
relatively small size of the dataset. Such results were discarded. 
Table 2: questions in the survey. 
Variable Question Scale 
Interest What are your reasons for being interested in Mount 
Zao? 
Selection with other field 
Hazards If Mount Zao erupts, how likely is it to produce the 
following hazards? (Lava flows, pyroclastic flows, gas 
emissions, ashfall, mudflows, landslide, phreatic 
explosion, mud eruption) 
Extremely likely (1) to 
extremely unlikely (5) 
Frequency How often do you think the volcano erupts? Selection (1 in X years), with 
X=10, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1000 
and do not know 
Impacts If Mount Zao erupted, how severe do you think the 
impacts would be in terms of: damage to property and 
infrastructure; damage to livelihood; loss of life 
Scale of extremely high (1) to 
extremely low (5) 
Evacperiod If Mount Zao erupted, do you think it would be 
necessary to evacuate… 
Selection between short-term 
(less than 3 months); long-
term (more than 3 months); a 
limited area; do not think 
evacuation necessary 
Forecast How easy do you think it is for scientists to forecast 
volcanic activity on a scale of: minutes, hours, weeks, 
months, years 
Scale from definitely possible 
(1) to impossible (5) 
Trust How much do you trust the following groups to provide 
information about volcanic activity at Mount Zao? 
(Scientists, JMA, Emergency services, local government, 
national government, tourist industry, mass media, 
social media, friends and family) 
Scale from trust completely 
(1) to do not trust at all (5) 
Responsibility To what extent are the following groups responsible for 
informing you about volcanic activity? (groups above) 
Scale from completely 
responsible (1) to not at all 
responsible (5) 
Statements To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? (If too many warnings are given, people 
stop taking them seriously; it’s always better to be safe 
than sorry; if one thinks there’s any risk at all, people 
must be warned; warnings that turn out to be 
unnecessary do more harm than good; if there is any 
chance that businesses will be harmed by an alert, it is 
better not to warn the population until we are certain 
an eruption will happen) 
Scale from completely agree 
(1) to completely disagree (5) 
 
Effects2015 Can you tell us how the alerts affected you and what 
you think about the current state of the volcano? This 
section also included a question about whether or not a 
visit by the Emperor helped improve sales. 
Selection from options (Yes = 
1, No = 2) 
Business 
impacts 
Respondents were asked whether or not the alert 
affected their business, and to estimate their loss of 
sales. They were also asked if there were measures that 
would have helped them. 
Yes/no, and numerical/text 
answers. 
Busimpqual To what extent was your business affected? Comments field 
Infosources What sources of information did you use during the 
crisis? 
Comments field 
Maxred What was your maximum reduction in sales? Text box 
Avred What was your average reduction in sales? Text box 
 
In addition to the variables in Table 2, a number of other variables were calculated. This was based 
on tests for reliability of scale (Cronbach’s alpha). These additional variables are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Cronbach’s alpha for calculated variables. A value >0.7 is generally considered robust 
(Field, 2000; Nunally and Bernstein, 1978). 
Name Formulation Cronbach’s alpha 
Allhaz Average of all hazard variables 0.93 
Allimpact Average of all impact variables 0.73 
Allforecast Average of all forecast variables 0.75 
Alltrust Average of all trust variables 0.92 
Allresp Average of all responsibility variables 0.89 
Shortterm Average of short-term forecast variables 0.85 
Medterm Average of longer-term forecast variables 0.88 
Trust_exp Av of trust scientists, JMA, emergency services 0.84 
Trust_govt Average of trust in local and national governments 0.86 
Trust_inf Av of tourist industry, social media, mass media, 
friends and family 
0.86 
Resp_exp Av of responsibility of scientists, JMA, emergency 
services 
0.79 
Resp_govt Average of responsibility of local and national 
governments 
0.90 
Resp_inf Av of tourist industry, social media, mass media, 
friends and family 
0.81 
Precaution Average of 2 precaution statements 0.64 
False alarms Average of 3 false alarm statements 0.75 
 
Results 
This section initially presents the demography of the respondents, and then the survey data. It 
presents the survey data first to elucidate general patterns, and then uses both the qualitative 
survey data and the interview data to draw out some of the nuances in the results.  
Demographics of respondents 
Survey 
The mean age of respondents was 58, and the majority were male (71%), representative of the 
higher incidence of male leadership of businesses in the area. All respondents were Japanese, and 
55% were from Yamagata Prefecture, with 44% from Miyagi (one was from Tokyo). Over 70% had 
lived in the region around the volcano for more than 20 years (this correlated with age, 
unsurprisingly, and care was taken to avoid multicollinearity in the subsequent analysis). Most were 
involved in tourism (either education or accommodation) – 65%, with the rest involved in retail and 
food; and 90% had experienced some form of loss during the 2015 warning period. Women tended 
to be younger (U-132.5, p<0.001) and to have (therefore) lived close to the volcano for less time 
(U=210.5, p=0.008).  
The survey respondents were hotel owners (56%), retailers (14%), educational tourist agencies (9%) 
and food vendors (20%), with one respondent not identifying in any category. The room rates of 
hotels varied by an order of magnitude, suggesting that a range of types and levels were covered. 
The number of rooms in the hotels varied from 5 to 200. 
Interviews 
Interviewees were based in hotels (6), a farm, an association and four retail stores (three of which 
were food-related;). The hotels ranged from over 100 rooms to around 10 rooms. Nine interviews 
took place in Miyagi, and three in Yamagata.  
Hazard perception 
Survey 
The data suggest that most respondents regarded lava flows, landslides and pyroclastic flows as 
unlikely (Table 4). Ash, mudflows, explosions and gas emissions were regarded as slightly more 
likely. This is interesting and reflects the qualitative results that suggest that risk perception was 
informed in part by recent volcanic activity elsewhere in Japan, rather than by the history of Mount 
Zao itself.  
There were significant differences in hazard perception by Prefecture, with respondents from 
Yamagata Prefecture consistently viewing hazards as less likely than those from Miyagi Prefecture 
(Table 4).  
Table 4. Results for the hazard variables. Note that 5 is extremely unlikely, while 1 is extremely 
likely. Mann-Whitney tests that were significant for Prefecture are reported with their p-values 
(the one resident from Tokyo was excluded). 






LAVA FLOW  4.4 5 0.98 77 442 (<0.01) 
PYROCLASTIC 
FLOW 
 4.1 4 1.1 77 411 (<0.01) 
ASH  3.0 3 1.4 81 248 (<0.001) 
EXPLOSIONS  3.3 3 1.3 77 388 (<0.01) 
GAS 
EMISSIONS 
 3.2 3 1.4 78 469 (<0.05) 
MUDFLOWS  3.4 3 1.3 77 396 (<0.01) 
LANDSLIDE  3.8 4 1.1 77 n.s. 
  
Respondents perceived the frequency of eruption as relatively low – with the modal value being “1 
in 100 years” (61%). Only 1% thought that there was one eruption every 10 years, and 10% thought 
one every 50. A further 20% thought that there was one eruption every 500 years, with 1% thinking 
every 250 years and another 7% every 1000 years. There were no significant predictor variables. 
Interviews and comments 
In general, interviewees from Yamagata prefecture viewed hazards as less likely than people from 
Miyagi prefecture. This is partly because the mudflow paths were perceived as mainly affecting the 
east of the volcano, since the volcano opens to the Miyagi direction (and therefore the risk to Miyagi 
is actually greater). Mudflows in general seemed to be more “real” to interviewees than other 
hazards. People viewed the risk as minor, and focussed on the role of the media in amplifying the 
risk. Several suggested that there should be national thresholds for the issuance of warnings.  
Perceived impacts of a potential eruption 
The next set of variables in the survey examined the perceived impacts of an eruption, focussing on 
the likely impact of an eruption on livelihoods, property and loss of life, and also examining views 
about the likely evacuation period.  
Table 5. Frequency data for the impact variables 






4 3.43 1.81 79 
LIVELIHOOD 
IMPACT 
1 1.85 1.52 80 
LOSS OF LIFE 4 3.82 1.40 79 
 
In general, most respondents thought that loss of property and life was unlikely, but loss of 
livelihood very likely (Table 5). They also thought that the impact in terms of evacuation would be 
minimal – 45% thought no evacuation at all; 32% thought an evacuation of a very small area might 
be necessary – e.g. around the summit; 11% thought a short evacuation of less than 3 months might 
be needed; and 10% thought that a longer-term evacuation might be necessary.  
The perceptions of loss of property and loss of life correlated strongly with the hazards variables – 
those who viewed the hazard as high also regarded the chance of losses as high. However, the 
livelihoods variable did not correlate with these variables, except for ash (and only at the 5% level – 
all other correlations were at the 0.1% level). This suggests that respondents’ experiences during the 
2015 warning period might have coloured their responses regarding the impact on livelihoods – 
since many had experienced this without any eruptive activity at all, though there is also likely a 
slight attenuation effect due to the skew on this variable (Table 5; note that Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient shows the same effect). Correlations are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Significant correlations between the hazard variables and the impact variables. 
 PROPERTY (P VALUE) LIVELIHOODS (P 
VALUE) 
LOSS OF LIFE (P 
VALUE) 
LAVA FLOWS 0.47 (<0.001) n.s. 0.45 (<0.001) 
PYROCLASTIC 
FLOWS 
0.43 (<0.001) n.s. 0.38 (0.001) 
ASH 0.51 (<0.001) 0.24 (<0.05) 0.54 (<0.001) 
PHREATIC 
ERUPTION 
0.36 (0.001) n.s. 0.36 (0.001) 
GAS 0.41 (<0.001) n.s. 0.34 (<0.01) 
MUDFLOW 0.53 (<0.001) n.s. 0.45 (<0.001) 
LANDSLIDE 0.54 (<0.001) n.s. 0.44 (<0.001) 
 
Perceptions of evacuation period similarly were associated with perceptions of hazard. This was a 
categorical variable, so the Kruskal Wallis test was used and showed that with the exception of lava 
flows and phreatic explosions, all the hazard variables had significant results, with lower perceptions 
of hazard associated in general with the view that no evacuation would be necessary.  
In summary, the impact variables were mostly related to perceived hazard. The exception is the 
perceived loss of livelihoods, which was independent of hazards, possibly because losses were 
experienced even without a volcanic eruption in 2015. 
The ease of forecasting eruptions: dealing with uncertainty 
The survey respondents were asked about five different timescales of forecasting – minutes, hours, 
weeks, months and years. In general, respondents viewed forecasting as relatively difficult, 
particularly over the longer timescales (median = 4; shorter timescales median =3). However, this 
was clearer over the long timescales – at short timescales, there were more respondents who 
viewed forecasting as possible (scoring 1 or 2). For scales of hours and weeks, the distribution is 
close to a normal distribution, whereas on the minutes scale the modal value is 5, but with 1 and 2 
both scoring more hits than 3 and 4. 
Those who viewed the risk to property as high also thought that forecasting over longer timescales 
was possible (ρ = 0.30, p<0.01). There were a number of strong relationships between these 
variables and the trust variables (below).  
Precaution and false alarms 
There were five statements about the communication of risk under conditions of uncertainty, 
particularly given the possibility of false alarms. These were grouped into 2 new variables, 
precaution and false alarms.  
Older people tended to disagree that unnecessary warnings do more harm than good, and also to 
disagree that warnings should not be issued if there is a risk of harm to businesses. People from 
Miyagi were also more likely to disagree that unnecessary warnings are problematic (U=913, 
p<0.05). The view that too many warnings could be problematic was associated with people who 
were not very trusting (ρ=-0.39, p<0.001) and who did not hold others as responsible (ρ=-0.29, 
p<0.01). They also tended to think that impacts would not be significant (ρ=-0.36, p<0.001). People 
who thought that businesses should only be warned if eruption is certain also tended not to trust 
experts (ρ=-0.39, p<0.001). 
There were significant cross-correlations between precaution and false alarms (ρ=-0.63, p<0.001), so 
partial correlations were used instead of Spearman’s ρ, controlling for false alarms when correlating 
other variables with precaution and vice versa. Precaution was strongly associated with the view 
that impacts would be severe (R=0.41, p<0.001) and was associated with the view that short-term 
forecasting is straightforward (R=0.33, p<0.01). Those who advocated precaution tended to be 
trusting (R = 0.40, p<0.001), particularly of experts (R=0.38, p<0.001), with government and then 
informal sources trailing.  
People who thought that the media were unhelpful tended to be sceptical about precaution (U=464, 
p=0.001) and concerned about false alarms (U=1,137, p<0.001). People who view the volcano as safe 
also tended to reject precaution (U=512, p<0.05), and also to agree that too many warnings can be 
problematic (U=942, p<0.05). The opposite was true for those who viewed the volcano as still 
uncertain. 
Trust and responsibility 
Two sets of variables concerned the agencies that are best trusted by the respondents, and those 
regarded as responsible for providing them with information.  
In general, trust in scientists, the JMA and emergency services (median = 3) was relatively high 
compared to trust in the governments, media, tourist industry and friends and family (median = 4). 
Responsibility was regarded as high for scientists, the JMA and emergency services (median = 2) and 
slightly less for the other groups (median =3).  
Trust (alltrust) was associated with a range of other variables (see supplementary data for 
correlation matrix). Those who viewed hazard as high also tended to be trusting (ρ = 0.39, p<0.001), 
as did those who generally felt the groups had responsibility for warning them (ρ=0.39, p<0.001). 
Those who regarded forecasting as challenging tended not to be trusting (ρ=0.44, p<0.001; ρ = 0.26, 
p<0.05). Those who thought the impacts would be severe also tended to be trusting (ρ=0.57, 
p<0.001). These patterns were across the variables (alltrust), but some were more marked with 
different groups. Trust in governments and informal sources was more strongly associated with 
these groups being responsible for warnings. Those who felt that the media were unhelpful were 
also less likely to trust the JMA, the national government and both mass and social media.  
Responsibility (allresp) was also associated with other variables as above, possibly due to collinearity 
with trust (Spearman’s correlation with alltrust = 0.39, p<0.001), but was not associated with longer 
term forecasting or hazards, or with the view that the media were unhelpful. While the 
responsibility of government was strongly associated with trust in local government, scientists, 
emergency services, tourist industry and friends and family (significant at 1% level), the links for the 
JMA, national government and media sources were significant at the 5% level. The view that 
scientists had responsibility for warning was associated with higher hazard awareness (ρ=0.25, 
p<0.05). Women tended to regard informal sources as holding responsibility for warnings (U=163, 
p<0.001).  
In summary, trust was associated with holding agencies responsible for warnings, with viewing risk 
as significant and thinking that forecasting would be relatively straightforward.  
Predicting trust 
Based on the correlations, a hierarchical regression model was used to predict trust, entering first 
“allimpact” and then short-term forecasting, and then precaution and false alarms. The results were 
significant for a model incorporating impacts and forecasting: respondents were more likely to be 
generally trusting if they also tended to believe that the impacts of an eruption would be significant, 
and could be forecast. This might suggest that trust was slightly associated with knowledge of 
outcomes. The best model also included false alarms, but not precaution, which did not significantly 
improve the result (Table 8; R2 = 0.51). There was no significant multicollinearity detected.  
Table 8. Regression results for trust 
Variable β t p-value 
Impacts 0.48 5.53 <0.001 
Short-term 
forecasting 
0.37 4.46 <0.001 
False alarms -0.17 -2.00 <0.05 
 
The 2015 alert  
Impacts, information and the media 
The respondents were asked for their views on whether the number of tourists reduced, whether 
the emperor’s visit had helped to bring back tourists, and whether or not the media were unhelpful 
during the 2015 crisis. They were also asked about the current status of the volcano – whether it is 
now safe, still uncertain or still uncertain but eruption is less likely than in 2015 (referred to as 
“Effects 2015” in Table 2). 
In total, 78% of respondents felt that the alerts had reduced the number of tourists, but only 10% 
felt that the emperor’s visit had helped to bring people back (in contrast with interviewees, who 
emphasised this as a useful measure). Interestingly too, only 44% viewed the role of the media as 
unhelpful (though there were a number of qualitative responses later in the survey that condemned 
the media strongly). The mean maximum reduction in sales was 37% and the mean average 
reduction was 27%. Those with a high maximum reduction estimate also tended to be against 
precaution (ρ=0.43, p<0.001) and slightly less likely to trust experts (ρ=0.30, p<0.05).  
In terms of the current status of the volcano, 35% regard the volcano as now safe, with 36% 
regarding it as still uncertain, and 45% saying uncertain but less likely to erupt (some had agreed 
with both uncertain and uncertain but less likely).  
Those who regarded the media as unhelpful were less likely to think the volcano would cause loss of 
life (U=456, p<0.01). They were also more likely to be younger (U=898, p<0.05) and to regard 
hazards as generally unlikely (U=156, p<0.05). 
People who thought that the volcano is now safe were more likely to think that loss of life is very 
unlikely (U=419, p<0.01). They were also more likely to think that the hazards were generally low 
(U=389, p<0.001). Those who thought it still uncertain showed the opposite pattern. 
In general, these results suggest that the respondents who regarded the volcano as lower risk in 
terms of hazards and impacts were more likely to think that the media were unhelpful and that the 
volcano is now safe.  
The impacts were backed up in the qualitative results. Many of the text comments on the survey 
suggested a “huge blow”, or “significantly lower sales”, partly because “tourists decreased”. One 
stated, “Customers ceased to exist throughout Zao Onsen”. Others mentioned that although there 
was some help for hotels (via coupons), this was not much use for restaurants. This backed up the 
views of interviewees – there was a significant decline in sales. However, there were variations 
between respondents on how long it took to pick up again – with some saying it was a few months, 
and others stating that it was continuing at the time of the study.  
Qualitative responses in the survey for the main sources of information used by the respondents 
were coded as 0 or 1 for media, experts, government, institutions, friends. These were used in 
Mann-Whitney tests to look for significant results. Those who obtained information from the media 
tended to be more trusting of experts (U = 383, p<0.01). They also tended to think that short-term 
forecasting is relatively straightforward (U = 399, p<0.01), and agreed that “it is better to be safe 
than sorry” (U=482, p<0.05). Those who used government sources tended to think that short-term 
forecasting is harder (U=798, p<0.05).  
Many respondents commented in the text boxes and in interviews on the negative impact of the 
alert as publicised by the media. However, survey respondents overwhelmingly also stated that they 
got information during the crisis from the media (72%), particularly via the television. Relatively few 
obtained information from government (25%) and fewer still from experts (9%) or institutions (11%). 
Interviewees argued that there should also be reporting when the volcano is safe again – so some 
form of positive non-news that would encourage visitors to go back again – and this was suggested 
by survey respondents as a measure they would like to see. There was a lot of concern that people 
did not know that the area is now safer and that they had essentially forgotten about it. Survey 
respondents and interviewees repeatedly used the phrase “rumour damage” to describe the impacts 
on their business, to the point where there was little separation between the warning and the 
rumour. This is consistent with the relationship between concern about false alarms and trust in 
different groups: the alert was closely associated with the view that warnings can be harmful. The 
failure of the media to then report that the volcano was safe was a source of considerable irritation 
to the interviewees, who also felt that they wanted more information from scientists. 
Some important observations and questions that came from interviewees concerned the issue of 
civic responsibility – in contrast, perhaps, to the behaviour of the media. One hotel, for example, had 
taken on additional supplies and safety equipment to provide to guests. Some mentioned that they 
had also been very proactive in obtaining information so that they could make sure that their guests 
were prepared. They were concerned, though, about the procedures in evacuation: very few 
respondents really knew how this would work. One mentioned the shelter in Togatta, but others 
were unaware of its existence. Most interviewees had some awareness of seminars being organised 
in their areas, including some expert seminars, and some organised by disaster management 
agencies. They had felt that these were useful but there could have been others. Some respondents 
had not been able to attend the seminars. Seminars in general were more valued in Miyagi than 
Yamagata. 
Governance 
An overwhelming issue in the eruption crisis, as perceived by business owners interviewed, was the 
consistency of issuance of alerts across Japan. This was linked to the view that, for example, some 
volcanoes have lots of earthquakes without alerts and so the alert at Zao was premature. It was also 
linked to the challenges with media coverage and with getting information and evidence from the 
authorities. There are several issues here. One is the lack of understanding of risk and particularly 
uncertainty in a volcanic crisis, and also the diversity between volcanoes in general. Some of this 
could be aided by education programmes, but a more productive approach would be to use 
participatory methods to involve the communities in risk reduction and use their local knowledge. 
There was also a clear distrust of some kinds and sources of information: experts were better 
trusted than other sources, but there was not a consensus on who should provide warnings. There 
was no awareness of any alert level system, for example, and yet there is such a system in Japan.  
In terms of government management, there were slight differences between Prefectures. Both 
Prefectures did use coupon schemes to try to help businesses recover. However, respondents felt 
that this should have been accompanied by statements about the safety of the region once the alert 
was over: the aid should be both financial and informational. Furthermore, there were issues around 
the use of the coupons: a coupon giving a percentage off the cost of accommodation is not much 
use to shops, and tended to lead to visitors going to the more expensive hotels, so the cheaper and 
smaller hotels tended to miss out. Since many of the expensive hotels were part of chains anyway, 
and could recoup losses from other branches around Japan, this was viewed as particularly unfair. To 
some extent, the visit of the emperor in June 2015 was useful in communicating that the area was 
safe again, although it was less highly regarded in the survey than it was by interviewees. 
Several interviewees were philosophical about the risk of an eruption, commenting that there was 
nothing they could do about it, and they would deal with it if it happens but not before. While some 
did view the crisis as a “false alarm”, others thought that the fact that there had been a crisis but 
nothing had affected them meant that future crises would also not affect them. This suggests that 
there may be risks in failing to communicate at least some of the explanation for the alert.  
Experiencing place 
Cascading crises  
Some interviewees struggled to distinguish the impacts from the volcanic alerts from the long-term 
impacts of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET), which occurred in 2011. GEJET had 
a huge impact on the region, not least because of the implication that the entire Tohoku region was 
rendered dangerous from the radiation at Fukushima. There was considerable frustration at the 
media coverage of GEJET, which was viewed as promoting this confusion. The volcanic alert then hit 
the economy during the recovery period. This suggests that impacts of disasters can also cascade, 
even if the disasters themselves are not physically linked – one survey respondent suggested that 
there was a “synergistic” relationship between these two events. For example, one interviewee had 
had to spend a lot of money to fix her house after GEJET since she did not have insurance. They had 
also suffered damage to their warehouse, and had to restore all of this at the same time that the 
alert was taking place. Another interviewee estimated that the combination of the two events had 
led to the closure of 30 hotels of the 200 in the region. Others felt that they had just about 
recovered from GEJET at the time of the alert, and then they were hit again. 
Analogue events 
The Ontake explosion was also mentioned by all interviewees and some survey respondents as 
having made things worse, because there was an assumption (also made by the interviewees) that 
the same thing could happen at Zao. This had two effects: that people were less likely to come 
because hiking at the summit is a key attraction; and that many of the interviewees thought that 
volcanic hazards were restricted to the area close to the summit. Indeed, it was clear that analogue 
events were important in conditioning people’s responses to the crisis. The other volcano that was 
familiar to interviewees was Sakurajima – and again this played a major role in conditioning their 
interpretation of the hazard – that the plume can be observed by the eye, and therefore since no 
plume could be seen at Zao, there was no risk. Whether or not they were concerned about the risk 
was therefore affected by the analogues with which they were most familiar. Their familiarity was 
based both on news reports and on the presence of family and friends in other regions – for 
example, one interviewee mentioned that he had a friend in Nagasaki who kept him informed about 
the status of Sakurajima.  
Cultural memory 
Several interviewees commented that they had never really thought about Zao as a volcano – they 
thought only about the Onsen. The 2015 crisis was the first time they recollected thinking about 
volcanic risk. Even after the crisis, one respondent stated that Zao is not a “magma volcano”. This 
was linked to their business interests: many tourists come to Zao, but they come primarily for the 
Onsen, Okama lake and the snow monsters. These are the objects dominantly associated with the 
area, rather than the fact that it is volcanic (even though both the Onsen and Okama are the result 
of the volcanic activity). The volcanic activity is largely unseen. This was also linked with the idea of 
rumour: because the earthquakes under the volcano were not felt earthquakes, and from the 
surface nothing had changed, it was difficult for people to perceive any difference when the alert 
was called. They were completely reliant on the warnings from experts and government.  
Respondents from Miyagi Prefecture tended to have heard about the past history from their 
parents, but viewed it as very long ago, and only affecting the top part of the volcano. A respondent 
from Yamagata mentioned that they were aware of an old volcanic crater, and that there was a 
landslide on Zao 80 years ago, where the ski slopes are now located. One respondent did mention 
the Zao monopoly game, which includes a story about the volcano: a myth that the Lord of the 
region – the famous Samurai Masamune Date – sent his seventh son, Munetaka Date to dance on 
the volcano to prevent an eruption in the seventeenth century, at the suggestion of a fortuneteller. 
Respondents also tended to identify strongly with their Prefecture – commenting that Yamagata 
faces different risks and has different coping strategies to Miyagi.  
Perception of space 
Several interviewees commented that tourists from further away tended to, in their view, 
overestimate the risk because they were not familiar with it. However, this view was not universal – 
one interviewee felt that local visitors were more frightened because the news had not spread too 
far away. This interviewee also noted that many of the tourists do not have very good geographical 
knowledge of the area and would telephone to ask about events that were very distant from 
Togatta. Several interviewees also mentioned the problem that tourists lack knowledge of the 
volcano’s topography, which is very complicated. Survey respondents further noted that this lack of 
knowledge extends to the TV stations and therefore complicated the media problems. In general, 
the lack of knowledge about the geography of the region was a source of frustration closely linked to 
media coverage. However, the respondents themselves also had questions about the geography of 
the region, particularly the names of different volcanoes in the area – some did not know which 
mountain was referred to as Zao (since there are several peaks in the Zao system, formed by past 
lava domes).  
The issue of distance perception was also important – several interviewees commented that tourists 
tended not to know how far from the volcano particular resort areas were, or how far the danger 
extended. This goes back to the issues around the GEJET: people associated a much wider area with 
the danger than respondents felt was appropriate.  
Some of the respondents were concerned about the Onsen drying up: the Onsen is of major 
economic value to the tourist industry. There were also other concerns related to economic 
productivity, particularly around the closure of the echo line (a major highway used by tour buses). 
As demonstrated by the quantitative data, most people involved in this study had very little 
knowledge about the volcano. In general, there were many issues raised in the interviews and survey 
results that could be dealt with via a sustained public engagement programme. 
Discussion 
The results demonstrate the significance of the warnings in 2015 for businesses in the region, and 
also include some important reflections on disaster risk reduction in Japan more generally.  
Cascading impacts and vulnerability 
One implication from this study is that the impacts of hazard events can cascade as much as hazards 
do – and do so independent of links between hazards. If populations are subject to a series of 
disasters, even over multi-year timescales, the impacts of those events can be partially cumulative – 
a problem familiar in the context of small island states, for example (Pelling and Uitto, 2001). 
Recovery is a complex process even when one event has occurred, but when several occur in 
succession – such as GEJET, heavy snow and then volcanic activity – the impacts are sustained and 
complex (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2015). They are also not purely economic – while this study 
focussed on businesses, it was clear that the psychological impact of the disasters was also 
significant, not only for the respondents but also for their customers. While much work has been 
done on disaster recovery, this has tended to focus on the impact of a single disaster rather than the 
combined impact of several. In the case of Zao, there was only the GEJET “disaster”: the Zao crisis 
only involved a period of raised alert level, and yet it had significant impact on the region according 
to the interviewees and the respondents. Their comments strongly suggest that GEJET had 
sufficiently increased their vulnerability to further disasters and even to periods of uncertainty: it 
had lowered their income whilst also creating expense for some (e.g. the interviewee who was still 
rebuilding). The warning period then further decreased sales. This underscores the point: impacts 
from warnings as well as from hazards should be taken into account in policy formation and 
economic planning.  
A further challenge, however, was that the two events (GEJET and the warning period) overlapped in 
their impacts, because respondents had not entirely recovered from GEJET. They therefore felt that 
it was challenging to distinguish the impacts completely – the impact of GEJET was effectively 
prolonged by the warning period. This suggests that there is considerable complexity in forensic 
examinations of disaster impacts across time periods, perhaps particularly when the scales and 
nature of the events are very different. This finding is relevant for forensic approaches that seek to 
understand the impacts of apparently single events. 
Governance and perception of forecasting 
While government help was appreciated, it was also viewed as too simplistic to help much in 
practice. Economic aid was clearly valued, but the overwhelming sense from the interviews in 
particular was that there was not enough help with information, before, during and after the crisis. 
This was not just information about the state of the volcano, but also with conveying messages 
about safety after the end of the crisis period. In part, this may stem from an inability to state that 
the volcano is safe (since any active volcano is always potentially dangerous – as evidenced by the 
explosion of Ontake). However, a statement that the increased activity had subsided to background 
levels might have been useful.  
The respondents tended to view short-term forecasting as easier than longer-term, but those who 
had used government sources of information (rather than media) tended to have a more realistic 
view of the ease of short-term forecasting. This might be due to differences in the wording of 
warnings, and in the nature of media reporting versus official documentation. This is interesting 
because it suggests that the government communication may have been more appropriate, but was 
not adequately communicated via the media. 
Trust  
The results also suggest that trust in the various groups was linked to perception of the potential 
impacts of an eruption, and to forecasting skill. Trust was higher among those who felt that impacts 
would be significant and forecasting is easy (so likely to be accurate). There were also indications 
from correlations that trust is partly a feature of personality, with some people who are trusting also 
tending to be cautious. This is consistent with previous studies (Eiser et al., 2015).  
The significance of concern about false alarms in predicting trust was less than the importance of 
both impacts and forecasting skill, but still important at the 5% level. This is unsurprising in the 
context of the interview and qualitative survey results, in which a number of respondents expressed 
concern about rumours and the fact that the volcano did not erupt (Dillon et al., 2011; Eiser et al., 
2012). There were also indications that trust has been eroded as a result of the crisis, since 
respondents were critical of government and particularly media.  
All of the issues around trust are symptomatic of the challenges around understanding and 
communication. This is not purely a matter of public understanding of science, since there is also a 
need for the authorities and experts to understand the needs that people have, and how their need 
for information impacts their behaviour. The communication of uncertainty might also have helped 
significantly in improving understanding of the alert and emphasising that the lack of an eruption 
was not really a false alarm (Hincks et al., 2014). While the link between ease of forecasting and 
trust is a bit concerning in this regard (since awareness of how hard forecasting is might lower trust, 
on first appearance), it is also possible that clearer communication of uncertainty would remove this 
factor from the model: other work suggests that accuracy of forecast is not the most important 
factor in trust (Eiser et al., 2015). 
Social fabric and the perception of space 
Two key areas of perception concern the geographical environment and the human context. The 
perception of distance around a disaster zone was raised by interviewees both with reference to the 
Zao crisis and to GEJET. Respondents felt that tourists viewed the entire region as dangerous, and 
had poor geographical knowledge. They attached a larger area on a map with a name than was 
appropriate. Furthermore, connectivity with other regions was also a factor: those who had friends 
in regions that experience volcanic risk (such as Kyushu) tended to adopt the stories that those 
friends had told them. Similarly, the media acted as a gateway for such stories – in this case, the 
story of Ontake: they were viewed as spreading “harmful rumours” that likened the Ontake events 
to those that might happen at Zao. This appeared to also feed off ongoing stigma attached to the 
region due to the Fukushima-Daiichi crisis – also noted by other authors (Bachev and Ito, 2014). 
This lack of geographical awareness led to several reactions. Some hotel owners felt an additional 
responsibility to their guests as a  result of their local knowledge, and emphasised this civic 
responsibility as a reason for needing better information and some dialogue with authorities. Many 
were frustrated with the lack of knowledge that long-distance guests had about the region, 
particularly its distance from Fukushima. However, this is both a problem with geographical 
knowledge about maps (Haynes et al., 2007b), and also with knowledge about hazards and their 
spatial scales – something that was also lacking among the respondents themselves as evidenced by 
the hazard perceptions data. The challenges were also symptomatic more generally of the volume of 
information available to the public about hazardous events – there are perhaps some similarities 
here with the “google your symptoms” trend in medicine and its links with health anxiety (White and 
Horvitz, 2009): there was a feeling that potential customers were being put off because they had 
access to information that they could not adequately triage. This contrasted with the view that 
several interviewees recalled prior to the crisis: that they had not realised Zao was a volcano. This is 
consistent with previous studies (Greene et al., 1981) at active volcanoes: the timescales of volcanic 
activity tend to be longer than human lifetimes, and memory is lost. 
Risk perception 
The perception of the likelihoods of hazards was relatively good in relation to scientific assessment 
(Kuri et al., 2017), although there was a tendency, especially obvious in interviews, that hazards 
recently experienced in Japan were rated more highly. This is consistent with the availability bias 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973), which is consistently reported in hazards research (Demuth et al., 
2016; Huang et al., 2016; Perry and Lindell, 2008).  
Respondents in Miyagi viewed the hazards as greater, and also tended to be less concerned about 
false alarms. This may partially be the result of the local topography: those in Yamagata are 
protected from the most hazardous flows, but are nevertheless vulnerable. Furthermore, there were 
differences in how the Prefectures had approached informing the public, particularly in holding 
seminars, with Miyagi respondents in interviews being rather more aware of information availability 
in this format than those in Yamagata. 
Public engagement 
Reducing the vulnerability of populations to disasters includes the inclusion of populations in risk 
planning (e.g. Gaillard and Mercer (2013)). Participatory techniques, for example, offer a means of 
combining local and scientific knowledge (e.g. Pelling (2007)). Citizen science is another method that 
is increasingly being used to involve communities in risk reduction and scientific data-gathering 
(Crain et al. (2014); see also Irwin (1995)and Haklay (2013) for discussion of the broad context of 
citizen participation in science). A conclusion of this paper is that the communities around Mount 
Zao would benefit from greater visibility of not only scientific information about the area, but also 
some engagement with the processes of decision-making and risk reduction: risk perception and 
scientific knowledge about the volcano were relatively poor, and there was a great deal of anxiety 
that the media held most of the power in risk communication, with inadequate engagement from 
government and experts. The reasons for low risk perception may relate to the lack of prior 
experience (Huang et al., 2016; Lindell, 2013), or to the experience that this event did not lead to an 
eruption – since there was no previous event in living memory, we cannot adequately assess this. In 
such contexts in particular, where there is no experience of hazardous events, it is not enough to 
employ a top-down, linear model of science communication. Science communication, and risk 
communication, involves dialogue, and dialogue involves listening (Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 2011).  
Conclusions and recommendations 
This study suggests the need for a sustained public engagement campaign in the Zao area – and 
potentially around other active but not erupting volcanoes in Japan. Such a campaign would be most 
effective if it included dialogue with the public rather than top-down education, and if it included a 
range of institutions, including government, the JMA and university groups. It would also benefit 
from being coordinated across the different prefectures, so that information is consistent. 
Furthermore, the alert level system and decision-making procedures should be clear to the public: 
many studies have shown that transparency is important in this regard. It is also important that the 
needs that people have are taken into consideration, to avoid the blanket imposition of policies that 
only benefit a fraction of the population. 
The paper also shows the impact of non-eruptions on populations around volcanoes. The most 
famous example of this is the 1976 phreatic activity at La Soufrière de Guadeloupe (Hincks et al., 
2014; Tazieff, 1977). However, in the case of Zao, the activity was much less visible but still 
presented an increase in the risk of eruption. In this case, a number of actions were suggested by the 
respondents that might help in such cases – such as information about the end of a crisis as well as 
its beginning. The conjunction of the crisis with the recovery period after GEJET was also significant 
for many respondents, demonstrating that the impacts of consecutive crises can cascade to increase 
vulnerability, and this needs to be considered in planning. 
Finally, the case study also demonstrates something of the complex synergies between people and 
their environments. The people who live on Mount Zao are dependent on it being a volcano (for the 
Onsen, the farmlands, the aesthetic appeal), and yet are also vulnerable to its behaviour as a 
volcano. This vulnerability is enhanced or mitigated by the behaviour of those in positions of power 
– including both scientists and government actors – and reveals the non-linearity of volcanic risk and 
its management: only when the needs of populations are discussed alongside the potential volcanic 
activity can progress be made. 
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